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NOTE
BENAY v. WARNER BROS.
ENTERTAINMENT, INC.:
NEW STANDARD NEEDED FOR
DETERMINING ACTUAL USE
INTRODUCTION
Picture a screenwriter who watches a movie and realizes that its
storyline is similar to a screenplay that she registered with the United
States Copyright Office. 1 The copyright prevents others from copying
the screenwriter’s method of expressing ideas. 2 Further suppose that the
screenwriter attempted to sell her screenplay to the film’s producer some
time before the release of the movie, but her screenplay was rejected.
Nevertheless, the two stories share the same familiar settings, historical
facts, and situations that are customary for their genre. For instance,
envision that the two works are about Japanese samurai and share such
elements as martial arts, decorative armor, and fight scenes involving the
use of katanas. 3
One cause of action the screenwriter may plead is copyright
infringement pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 501(b). 4 In this context, the court
would interpret federal law to determine if the screenwriter is afforded
relief. 5 Suppose that the screenwriter brings a copyright infringement
1

The United States Copyright Office reviews copyright applications and issues certificates
of registration when all the registration formalities are satisfied. 17 U.S.C.A. § 410 (Westlaw 2011).
2
Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 823 (9th Cir. 2002).
3
Katana is a moderately curved, single-edged sword historically associated with Japanese
samurai. Katana Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/katana (last
visited Apr. 26, 2011).
4
17 U.S.C.A. § 501(b) (Westlaw 2011).
5
Id.
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action and alleges that the production company copied aspects of her
screenplay without permission. The court will require a showing of
substantial similarity between the screenwriter’s copyrighted work and
the alleged infringing work for the screenwriter to prevail. 6 Since the
copyright infringement standard for substantial similarity is a high
burden to meet, the screenwriter will not find relief under federal law by
merely showing similarities between characteristics that typically arise
from the two works’ shared genre. 7
Imagine that the screenwriter also pleads a separate cause of action
for breach of contract. Courts in this context refer to state law to
determine if a contract existed and if the defendant breached the
agreement. 8 Although breach of an express contract may be an available
cause of action, due to their superior bargaining power over
screenwriters, producers will seldom make explicit agreements. 9 The
screenwriter may nonetheless plead a breach of an implied-in-fact
contract. A California claim for breach of an implied-in-fact contract
over the use of an idea also requires substantial similarity between the
works, but California has a much lower standard of proof for substantial
similarity than a federal copyright infringement claim. 10 Either cause of
action, however, may provide the plaintiff protection of rights to his or
her creative work. 11 While the availability of multiple causes of action
with varying standards of proof may please the screenwriter, it creates
problems because authors are given too much protection in their creative
works at the expense of the promotion of art and science.
In Benay v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc., the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was presented with both causes of

6

Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 462 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 2000)).
7
See Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 625 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that
the similarities between the two works were insufficient for copyright infringement, since most
similarities arose naturally from the two works’ shared premise of an American war veteran who
travels to Japan to fight the samurai rebellion).
8
23 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 63:10 (4th ed. 2010).
9
Kerry Ryan, Using the Uniform Commercial Code to Protect the “Ideas” That Make the
Movies, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 693, 697-98 (1987) (discussing producers’ reluctance to make
express contracts due to their greater bargaining power over screenwriters).
10
See Benay, 607 F.3d at 631 (“[O]ur holding (above) that the Screenplay and the Film are
not substantially similar for purposes of copyright infringement does not preclude a finding of
substantial similarity for purposes of an implied-in-fact contract under California law.”).
11
See Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1363 (9th Cir. 1990) (reversing summary judgment
on the copyright infringement claim since there were enough similarities between the two works at
issue to present a triable issue of material fact); see also Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No.
C 706083, 1990 WL 357611, at *15 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 8, 1990) (finding that there were enough
similarities between the two works at issue for purposes of breach of contract).
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action and concluded that a lack of substantial similarity under federal
copyright infringement law did not preclude a finding of substantial
similarity under California law for breach of an implied-in-fact
contract. 12 Two brothers, Aaron and Matthew Benay (the “Benays”),
wrote a screenplay entitled The Last Samurai (the “Screenplay”), and
provided a written copy of the Screenplay to Warner Brothers
Entertainment, Inc. (“Warner Brothers”). 13 The parties created an
implied-in-fact contract with the mutual understanding that the Benays
would be compensated if Warner Brothers used the Screenplay to
produce a movie. 14 After Warner Brothers released the film The Last
Samurai (the “Film”), the Benays brought an action that included claims
for copyright infringement under federal law and breach of implied-infact contract under California law. 15 The Benays alleged that they were
never compensated after Warner Brothers copied aspects from their
Screenplay to produce the Film. 16 In support of their claim, the Benays
pointed to similarities in historical facts, common characters, and
standard scenes that naturally arose from the two works’ shared premise
of an American war veteran who travels to Japan to fight the samurai
rebellion. 17 These similarities, however, were mere “unprotectable
elements” that flowed necessarily and naturally from their basic plot
premise. 18 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary
judgment for Warner Brothers on the federal claim, because substantial
similarity between mere unprotectable elements is insufficient to prove
copyright infringement. 19 However, the Ninth Circuit reversed and
remanded the grant of summary judgment on the California law contract
claim because a showing of substantial similarity between unprotectable
elements is not necessarily insufficient to prove a breach of an impliedin-fact contract claim. 20
This Note examines Benay v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc., and
the substantial-similarity standard under a California breach of an
implied-in-fact contract claim and a federal copyright infringement
claim. The standard used in Benay will hinder the free flow of ideas by

12

Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 631 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 622.
14
Id. at 622-23.
15
Id. at 622.
16
Id.
17
Id. at 625.
18
Id. (explaining that unprotectable elements “are shared historical facts, familiar stock
scenes, and characteristics that flow naturally from the works’ shared basic plot premise”).
19
Id. at 629.
20
Id. at 632.
13
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deterring producers from accepting an author’s screenplay for fear of
breaching an implied-in-fact contract. Part I of this Note summarizes the
history and development of the protection of rights to creative works.
Part II provides the facts and procedural history of Benay v. Warner
Bros. Entertainment, Inc. Part III analyzes and criticizes the Ninth
Circuit’s holding in Benay. Finally, Part IV proposes that California’s
standard for a breach of an implied-in-fact contract claim, like that
brought by the Benays, should be heightened so that a plaintiff must
show substantial similarity between protectable elements, not merely
between unprotectable elements. This Note proposes a standard that will
not only promote the purposes of copyright law but also better indicate
when the plaintiff’s work was actually used in creating the defendant’s
production.
I.

HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROTECTION OF RIGHTS TO
CREATIVE WORKS

A.

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT UNDER FEDERAL LAW

The enactment of copyright laws in the United States is authorized
by the Copyright Clause of the federal Constitution, which states, “The
Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” 21 In
response, Congress has authorized the copywriting of works under 17
U.S.C. § 501(b), which empowers a copyright holder to institute an
action for copyright infringement. 22 However, an author does not have
an absolute right to prevent others from creating a similar work. 23
Others are free to use the same fact or idea as the author did, as long as
they do not copy the author’s original expression. 24
A copyright therefore gives limited rights to an author by preventing
others from copying his or her method of using facts and expressing

21

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17 U.S.C.A. § 501(b) (Westlaw 2011).
23
17 U.S.C.A. § 102(b) (Westlaw 2011) (“In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation,
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work.”).
24
See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879) (“The copyright of a book on
perspective, no matter how many drawings and illustrations it may contain, gives no exclusive right
to the modes of drawing described, though they may never have been known or used before.”).
22

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol41/iss3/4

4

Casido: Copyright & Actual Use
CASIDO (FORMATTED).DOC

2011]

5/5/2011 5:05:29 PM

COPYRIGHT & ACTUAL USE

331

ideas. 25 While copyright protection instantly attaches upon the creation
of an original work, registration must be made with the United States
Copyright Office before a claim for copyright infringement may be
brought. 26 To register a copyright, a registrant must send a completed
application form, a filing fee, and records of the work to the United
States Copyright Office. 27 The United States Copyright Office reviews
the application for errors and issues a certificate of registration when all
the registration formalities are satisfied. 28
In order to prevail on a federal copyright infringement claim, the
plaintiff must show that he or she owned a copyright, and that the
defendant copied original elements of the copyrighted work. 29 To
establish the latter, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had access
to the copyrighted work, and that there is substantial similarity between
the copyrighted work and the alleged infringing work under two tests:
the intrinsic test and the extrinsic test. 30
1.

The Intrinsic Test

The intrinsic test is a subjective comparison that focuses on whether
the ordinary, reasonable audience would find the two works substantially
similar in their total concept and feel. 31 The inquiry must be made
without expert analysis and requires the plaintiff to prove that an
ordinary observer would find that the ideas between the two works are
substantially similar. 32 Thus, the pivotal issue is what makes two works
“substantially similar.”
In Litchfield v. Spielberg, Lisa Litchfield, the author of a musical
play entitled Lokey from Maldemar brought suit against the producers of
the film E.T.: The Extra-Terrestrial for federal copyright infringement,
among other claims. 33 Since expert testimony and the comparison of
individual features of the works are not appropriate when applying the
intrinsic test, the only available evidence to infer substantial similarity
25

Id.
17 U.S.C.A. § 411 (Westlaw 2011).
27
17 U.S.C.A. § 408 (Westlaw 2011).
28
17 U.S.C.A. § 410 (Westlaw 2011).
29
Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 462 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing
Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)).
30
See Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1292 (9th Cir. 1985) (stating that the substantialsimilarity requirement implies a two-pronged analysis of general ideas and the expression of those
ideas).
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1354-55 (9th Cir. 1984).
26
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was the total concept and feel of the two works. 34 The Ninth Circuit
observed that Lokey from Maldemar used satire to critique mankind’s
egotism, whereas E.T.: The Extra-Terrestrial used character
development to highlight the bond between a child and an extraterrestrial. 35 Applying the intrinsic test, the so-called “Court of Appeals
for the Hollywood Circuit” 36 held that no reasonable juror would find
that E.T.: The Extra-Terrestrial was substantially similar to Lokey from
Maldemar. 37
2.

The Extrinsic Test—Protectable Elements Versus Unprotectable
Elements

The extrinsic test is an objective comparison that focuses on
whether the individual expressive elements of the works are substantially
similar. 38 For instance, the extrinsic test can focus on similarities
between the plot, themes, dialogue, mood, setting, pace, characters, and
sequence of events. 39 Unlike the intrinsic test, the court “compares, not
the basic plot ideas for stories, but the actual concrete elements that make
up the total sequence of events and the relationships between the major
characters.” 40 On a motion for summary judgment, the court applies
only the extrinsic test, because the intrinsic test is the jury’s exclusive
responsibility. 41 If the plaintiff fails to satisfy the extrinsic test, summary
judgment is entered for the defendant, but if plaintiff satisfies the
extrinsic test, there must be a trial on the intrinsic test. 42
In Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, for example, Jeffrey
Kouf alleged that Walt Disney Pictures & Television’s film Honey, I
Shrunk the Kids, involving kids who were accidently shrunk by a ray gun
invention, infringed on his copyrighted screenplay The Formula, about a

34

Id. at 1357.
Id.
36
White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1521 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“For better or worse, we are the Court of Appeals for
the Hollywood Circuit.”).
37
Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1357.
38
Id. at 1356.
39
See Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 632 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Kouf
v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 1994)).
40
Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1293 (9th Cir. 1985).
41
See Benay, 607 F.3d at 632 (“On a motion for summary judgment, we apply only the
extrinsic test. The intrinsic test is left to the trier of fact.”); see also Funky Films, Inc. v. Time
Warner Entm’t Co., 462 F.3d 1072, 1081 (9th Cir. 2006) (applying only the extrinsic test and finding
that the two works at issue were not substantially similar).
42
Benay, 607 F.3d at 632.
35
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boy genius who invented a formula to shrink people. 43 The two works
had substantially different plots, themes, and sequences of events, given
that the characters in Honey, I Shrunk the Kids and The Formula were
“shrunk to different sizes (1/4 inch versus 1 foot), by different means
(ray gun machine versus liquid formula), for different reasons (accident
versus evil thieves), [and] with different frequency (once versus several
times).” 44 The mood, setting, and pace differed because The Formula
was a dark adventure that took place at many different locations in the
span of a week, whereas Honey, I Shrunk the Kids was a light-hearted
comedy that took place at the family residence in less than a day. 45
Applying the extrinsic test, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district
court that the works were not substantially similar. 46
When applying the extrinsic test, the court must separate the
protectable elements from the unprotectable elements. 47 Unprotectable
elements include stock scenes, historical facts, and themes that are
staples of literature. 48 Unprotectable scènes-à-faire refer to customary
characters, scenes or situations that naturally arise from a basic plot
premise. 49 An example of scènes-à-faire can be found in Walker v. Time
Life Films, Inc., involving a book and a film that depicted adventures of a
New York police department. 50 The Second Circuit found that
“[e]lements such as drunks, prostitutes, vermin and derelict cars would
appear in any realistic work about . . . policemen in the South Bronx,”
and were therefore unprotectable scènes-à-faire. 51 Furthermore, “[f]oot
chases and the morale problems of policemen, not to mention the
familiar figure of the Irish cop, are venerable and often-recurring themes
of police fiction.” 52
After the elements of the works have been separated, the court must
inquire into whether the protectable elements, and not the unprotectable
elements, are substantially similar. 53 Copyright protection, thus, cannot

43

Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1043 (9th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 1045.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 1046.
47
See Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 822 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that there
was insufficient similarity after the protectable elements were separated from the unprotectable
elements).
48
Id. at 822-23.
49
Id.
50
Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 46-47 (2d Cir. 1986).
51
Id. at 50.
52
Id.
53
Cavalier, 297 F.3d at 822.
44
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be extended to stock characters or familiar scenes in a story. 54 If all the
similarities between the works arise from the use of unprotectable
elements, the plaintiff fails to satisfy the extrinsic test. 55 In Williams v.
Crichton, for instance, Geoffrey Williams, author of a series of
children’s books entitled Dinosaur World, brought an action for
copyright infringement against the creators of the movie Jurassic Park. 56
The Second Circuit found no infringement because the elements of
electrified fences, automated tours, and dinosaur nurseries were
unprotectable scènes-à-faire that inevitably flowed from the two works’
shared premise of a dinosaur adventure park. 57
Treating the protectable elements and unprotectable elements
differently is justified by the distinction between an unprotectable idea
and the protectable expression of that idea. 58 This so-called “ideaexpression dichotomy” means that “[c]opyright law only protects
expression of ideas, not the ideas themselves.” 59 In Baker v. Selden, the
landmark case explaining the idea-expression dichotomy, Charles Selden
obtained a copyright for a book on the art of bookkeeping, which he
called Selden’s Condensed Ledger. 60 Baker produced a book with a
similar bookkeeping method that achieved similar results but was made
with a different arrangement of columns and headings. 61 The United
States Supreme Court held that Selden’s Condensed Ledger was not
infringed by Baker’s book, since an author’s original expression is
protected by copyright, while the facts and ideas explained by the work
are public property. 62 This principle attempts to reward individuals for
their creativity and effort while at the same time promoting the progress
of science and art by permitting the public to use the same subject
matter. 63 For fear of granting monopolies over ideas, copyright law
prevents individuals from taking the basic idea for a story out of the
circulation of public property. 64 The courts have recognized that authors
must work from ideas within the public domain, and in turn, the courts

54

Id. at 823.
Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 632 (9th Cir. 2010).
56
Williams v. Crichton, 84 F.3d 581, 582 (2d Cir. 1996).
57
Id. at 589.
58
Cavalier v. Random House, Inc., 297 F.3d 815, 823 (9th Cir. 2002).
59
Id.
60
Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 99-101 (1879).
61
Id.
62
Id. at 107.
63
Karen L. Poston, All Puff and No Stuff: Avoiding the Idea/Expression Dichotomy, 9 LOY.
L.A. ENT. L. REV. 337, 343 (1989).
64
Id.
55

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol41/iss3/4

8

Casido: Copyright & Actual Use
CASIDO (FORMATTED).DOC

2011]

5/5/2011 5:05:29 PM

COPYRIGHT & ACTUAL USE

335

have created the distinction between protectable elements and
unprotectable elements. 65
B.

EXPRESS CONTRACT UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW

State law offers protection of rights to creative works under certain
contractual circumstances. 66 While copyright infringement is based on
federal law, 67 breach of contract is independently grounded in state
law. 68 For instance, federal copyright law offers an author protection as
against everyone, even those who never entered into a contract with the
author. 69 Thus, a screenwriter is able to bring both a federal copyright
infringement claim and a state breach of contract claim. 70 An express
contract is an agreement the conditions of which are explicitly stated in
words. 71 However, while there are a large number of screenwriters who
wish to sell their ideas, there are fewer production companies that wish
to buy screenplays. 72 As a result of their superior bargaining power over
screenwriters, production companies will hardly ever make explicit
promises, and therefore, express contracts are rarely of help to
screenwriters. 73 However, other causes of action are still available to
screenwriters.
C.

IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW

An implied-in-fact contract is one in which the parties’ agreement is
not expressed in words. 74 An implied-in-fact contract, for example,
includes conditions that are manifested by conduct. 75 In the absence of
an express contract, when a service or good is requested, then
subsequently rendered or provided, the law infers or implies a promise to
65

Id.
See Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 629 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Contract law,
whether through express of implied-in-fact contracts, is the most significant remaining state-law
protection for literary or artistic ideas.”).
67
17 U.S.C.A. § 501(b) (Westlaw 2011).
68
23 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 63:10 (4th ed. 2010).
69
See generally Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1043 (9th Cir.
1994) (recognizing that the plaintiff was able to bring a copyright infringement claim even though a
contract was never entered into with defendant).
70
Id.
71
1 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1:5 (4th ed. 2010).
72
Kerry Ryan, Using the Uniform Commercial Code to Protect the ‘Ideas’ That Make the
Movies, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 693, 697 (1987).
73
Id. at 697-98.
74
Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 267-68 (Cal. 1956).
75
Id. at 269.
66
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pay for it. 76 If the law obligates the producer to provide compensation
for the use of the author’s idea and the producer refuses to pay, then the
implied-in-fact contract has been breached. 77
An author may therefore plead a cause of action for breach of an
implied-in-fact contract under state law. 78 The California Supreme Court
announced the rule for the formation of an implied-in-fact contract for
the use of an idea in the case of Desny v. Wilder, the landmark decision
in so-called “idea submission cases.” 79 Victor Desny telephoned the
office of Billy Wilder, the producer for Paramount Pictures, and read his
synopsis for a movie to Wilder’s secretary. 80 Although Desny never
directly communicated with Wilder, the secretary had authority to
receive and transmit messages to Wilder. 81 Desny told the secretary that
Wilder could use the story only if Desny was paid “the reasonable value
of it.” 82 The secretary assured Desny that if Wilder and Paramount
Pictures used the story, “naturally we will pay you for it.” 83 Alleging
that he was never compensated after his idea was used in Wilder’s
motion picture photoplay entitled Ace in the Hole, Desny brought an
action under California law for breach of an implied-in-fact contract. 84
The Desny court held that an implied-in-fact contract exists when
the author conditions the disclosure of an idea upon an obligation to pay
for it if used, and the buyer voluntarily accepts the disclosure knowing
the reasonable value of the work and the condition on which it was
tendered. 85 Merely accepting Desny’s submission of his idea did not
alone contractually obligate Wilder to compensate Desny. 86 Instead,
Wilder manifested his assent by knowing the condition to pay for the
disclosure of the idea, and then accepting Desny’s condition. 87 The
conduct of Wilder in accepting the work, therefore, implied a promise to
fulfill the condition of payment, and as a result, an implied-in-fact
contract was created. 88

76

Id. at 266.
Id. at 270.
78
Id. at 278.
79
Id. at 274.
80
Id. at 262.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 270.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
77
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Federal Preemption of State Law Protection

Since copyright is governed by federal law 89 and idea submission
claims are built on state law, 90 federal law can preempt protection of
rights to creative works under the Supremacy Clause. 91 In 1976,
Congress invalidated most state copyright laws by enacting the Federal
Copyright Act, which states in relevant part:
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright . . . in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible
medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright
. . . are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is
entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under
the common law or statutes of any State. 92

Any state law protecting an author’s rights to his or her creative
work is preempted insofar as the state law falls within the scope of the
federal law. 93 That is, if the plaintiff’s state law contract claim alleges
rights that are entirely covered by a federal copyright infringement claim,
then the plaintiff’s state law contract claim will be barred. 94 However, a
state breach of an implied-in-fact contract claim will not be preempted
by the Federal Copyright Act if the claim alleges an extra element that
distinguishes it from a federal copyright infringement claim. 95
2.

Distinguishing State Law Claims from Federal Law Claims

In Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., the Ninth Circuit found that a
federal copyright infringement claim did not preempt a California breach
of an implied-in-fact contract claim. 96 Jeff Grosso submitted his
screenplay The Shell Game to Miramax Film Corp. with the mutual
understanding that Grosso would be reasonably compensated if his idea
89

17 U.S.C.A. § 501(b) (Westlaw 2011).
23 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 63:10 (4th ed. 2010).
91
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”).
92
17 U.S.C.A. § 301(a) (Westlaw 2011).
93
Id.
94
Grosso v. Miramax Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2004).
95
Id.
96
Id.
90
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was used. 97 Grosso filed a breach of contract claim under California law
and a copyright infringement claim under federal law, alleging that
Miramax Film Corp. used his idea when it made the movie Rounders,
which, like The Shell Game, involved poker players in high-stakes games
of Texas Hold’em. 98 The Grosso court affirmed the grant of summary
judgment for Miramax Film Corp. on the federal copyright infringement
claim, due to lack of substantial similarity between the two works. 99
Although both works had poker settings, the two works were not
substantially similar because the only similarities in dialogue arose from
“the use of common, unprotectable poker jargon.” 100 As for the breach
of contract claim, however, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court
erred in holding that the state law claim was equivalent to the federal law
claim. 101 The Ninth Circuit held that Grosso’s claim for breach of an
implied-in-fact contract was not preempted by the Federal Copyright
Act, because the extra element of an “implied promise to pay” for the use
of the idea transformed the claim from one arising under federal law to
one built on state contract law. 102
In an idea submission case, to prevail under California law on a
breach of an implied-in-fact contract claim, the plaintiff must prove that
(1) he or she submitted the work for sale to the defendant, (2) he or she
conditioned the use of the work on payment, (3) the defendant knew or
should have known of the condition, (4) the defendant voluntarily
accepted the work, (5) the defendant actually used the work, and (6) the
work had value. 103 The fifth element, actual use of the plaintiff’s idea by
the defendant, has been the most controversial and difficult to prove in
idea submission cases. 104 California courts permit actual use to be
inferred from evidence of the defendant’s access to the idea and
substantial similarity between the defendant’s production and plaintiff’s
idea. 105 The degree of similarity necessary to show actual use depends
on the conditions of the parties’ contract. 106 In breach of express
contract claims, the degree of similarity required hinges on the terms of
97

Id. at 967.
Id.
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 968.
102
Id.
103
Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 629 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Mann v.
Columbia Pictures, Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 522, 533 n.6 (Ct. App. 1982); Faris v. Enberg, 158 Cal. Rptr.
704, 709 (Ct. App. 1979)).
104
See, e.g., Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 522, 533 (Ct. App. 1982).
105
Id. at 534.
106
Benay, 607 F.3d at 630.
98
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the agreement. 107 In breach of implied-in-fact contract claims, since the
parties have not specified any terms, “the weight of California authority
is that there must be substantial similarity between plaintiff’s idea and
defendant’s production to render defendant liable.” 108 This is the law the
Ninth Circuit applied in Benay v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc.
II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF BENAY V. WARNER BROS.
ENTERTAINMENT, INC.

The Benays wrote their Screenplay The Last Samurai between 1997
and 1999, and they registered it with the United States Copyright Office
in 2001. 109 On May 9, 2000, the Benays’ agent, David Phillips, orally
pitched the Screenplay to Richard Solomon, the President of Production
for Bedford Falls Productions, Inc. (“Bedford Falls”), a production
company in association with Warner Brothers. 110 On May 16, 2000,
Phillips provided a written copy of the Screenplay to Solomon with the
condition that the Benays would be compensated if Bedford Falls used it
to produce a movie. 111 After receiving the Screenplay, Solomon told
Phillips that Bedford Falls had declined to use the Screenplay because it
was already developing a similar project. 112 On December 5, 2003,
Bedford Falls and Warner Brothers publicly released the Film The Last
Samurai. 113
The Screenplay is a fast-paced adventure story based around James
Gamble, a successful professor living in the United States with his wife
and son. 114 He is haunted by his mistake during the Civil War where he
accidentally killed eight of his own soldiers. 115 At the request of
President Grant, Gamble travels to Japan to lead the Japanese Imperial
Army against a samurai rebellion led by a samurai named Saigo. 116
Gamble’s son is killed by Saigo, which sends Gamble into an opium
addition. 117 He is eventually saved from despair by his wife and

107

Id.
Id. at 631 (quoting 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
19D.08[A] (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2009)).
109
Id. at 622.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 622-23.
112
Id. at 623.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
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Masako, a female samurai warrior who betrayed Saigo. 118 Gamble then
seeks to exact revenge by leading the Imperial Army in a series of battles
against the samurai rebels. 119 During the final battle, Saigo kills Masako
in a sword fight, but Gamble, in turn, kills Saigo. 120 The Screenplay
ends with Gamble returning to the United States, where he lives with his
wife and a newborn baby named Masako. 121
The Film employs a nostalgic and reflective mood driven by Nathan
Algren, a lonely alcoholic who has just been fired from his job selling
rifles. 122 He is haunted by his participation in a brutal attack on an
innocent tribe during the Indian Wars. 123 Algren is recruited by his
former commanding officer to travel to Japan to train the Imperial Army
in modern warfare against the samurai rebellion led by their honorable
leader named Katsumoto. 124 After Algren is captured by samurai
warriors at the end of the first battle, he is assimilated into the samurai
way of life. 125 He develops a friendship with Katsumoto and begins a
romantic relationship with Taka, the widow of a samurai warrior. 126 He
learns to appreciate the samurai culture and eventually joins the samurai
against the Imperial Army. 127 After the samurai lose in the final battle
against the Imperial Army, Algren confronts the Japanese Emperor and
teaches him the value of traditional samurai culture. 128 The Film ends
with Algren returning to the samurai village, where he lives with Taka. 129
Bedford Falls contended that the Film was developed independently
of the Screenplay. 130 The Film’s writer, Edward Zwick, alleged that
before the Benays’ Screenplay was pitched to Solomon, he had
conceived of his own story about a war veteran confronting Japanese
culture. 131 Zwick invited John Logan and Marshall Herskovitz to work
with him on this project, and by April 12, 2000, one month before the
Benays’ agent submitted the Screenplay to Bedford Falls, they had
independently formed all of the main elements of what would become
118

Id.
Id.
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the Film. 132
The Benays alleged that the creators of the Film copied many
aspects from the Screenplay without permission, and they filed suit on
December 5, 2005, two years after the release of the Film. 133 Warner
Bros. Entertainment, Inc., Bedford Falls Productions, Inc., Radar
Pictures, Inc., Edward Zwick, John Logan, and Marshall Herskovitz
(collectively “Warner Brothers”) were named as defendants. 134 The
Benays asserted four claims for relief: copyright infringement under
federal law, as well as breach of contract, breach of confidence, and
intentional interference with prospective economic advantage under
Arguing that the Benays could not establish
California law. 135
substantial similarity between the Screenplay and the Film, Warner
Brothers moved for summary judgment on the copyright and breach of
contract claims. 136
The United States District Court for the Central District of
California granted summary judgment to Warner Brothers on both
claims. 137 The district court reasoned that since all the similarities
between the works arose from unprotectable elements, no reasonable
juror could find that the Benays’ Screenplay and Warner Brothers’ Film
were substantially similar for purposes of copyright infringement. 138 In
addition, the district court found that there was insufficient evidence of
similarities on which a reasonable juror could conclude that Warner
Brothers actually used the Benays’ Screenplay under a California breach
of an implied-in-fact contract claim. 139 The Benays appealed the grant of
summary judgment and the case went before the Ninth Circuit. 140
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S HOLDING AND REASONING
The Ninth Circuit held that Warner Brothers was properly granted
summary judgment on the copyright infringement claim because a
comparison of the two works showed that the similarities were merely
between unprotectable elements. 141 However, the Ninth Circuit held that

132

Id.
Id. at 623.
134
Id. at 622.
135
Id. at 623.
136
Id.
137
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 629.
133
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such similarities may be sufficient to find that an implied-in-fact contract
was breached. 142 Thus, the Ninth Circuit recognized that unlike a federal
copyright infringement claim, in a California breach of implied-in-fact
contract claim, the court may inquire whether the unprotectable elements
as well as the protectable elements are substantially similar. 143
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment on
the contract claim and remanded for the district court to determine
whether there was actual use of the Benays’ Screenplay by Warner
Brothers. 144
A.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S RATIONALE FOR AFFIRMING THE GRANT OF
WARNER BROTHERS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE
FEDERAL COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT CLAIM

Since Warner Brothers did not deny that the Benays owned a valid
copyright, the issue on appeal for the copyright infringement claim was
whether there was substantial similarity between the two works. 145
Applying the extrinsic test, the Ninth Circuit compared the two works’
plot, characters, theme, settings, mood, pace, dialogue, title and sequence
of events. 146 The Ninth Circuit did not find it surprising that a
Hollywood film about the samurai rebellion would tell the story from an
American character’s perspective. 147 To the extent the works shared
themes, scenes and dialogue, these elements arose naturally from the
storyline of an American war veteran who travels to Japan to fight the
samurai. 148 And, although the leader of the samurai rebellion was one of
the works’ main characters, this character was based on Saigo Takamori,
a historical figure commonly associated with the samurai rebellion. 149
Likewise, the shared title between the Screenplay and the Film was also
insignificant because Saigo Takamori is commonly referred to as “The
Last Samurai.” 150 Ultimately, although the two works shared a number
of similarities, the Ninth Circuit found that the similarities were between
142

Id. at 632.
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 625.
146
Id.
147
Id. at 626.
148
Id. at 628.
149
Id. at 626-27 (citing Charles L. Yates, Saigo Takamori in the Emergence of Meiji Japan,
28 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 449, 449 (1994); KENNETH G. HENSHALL, A HISTORY OF JAPAN: FROM
STONE AGE TO SUPERPOWER 78 (Palgrave Macmillan 2d ed. 2004)).
150
Benay, 607 F.3d at 629 (citing Charles L. Yates, Saigo Takamori in the Emergence of
Meiji Japan, 28 MOD. ASIAN STUD. 449, 449 (1994)).
143
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unprotectable elements that flowed naturally from their shared premise
and were therefore disregarded for purposes of federal copyright
infringement. 151
B.

THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S RATIONALE FOR REVERSING AND
REMANDING THE GRANT OF WARNER BROTHERS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE CALIFORNIA BREACH OF AN
IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT CLAIM

The Ninth Circuit held that the absence of federal copyright
infringement did not preclude a finding of substantial similarity for
purposes of California breach of an implied-in-fact contract. 152 Since
Warner Brothers did not deny that the parties entered into an implied-infact contract, the issue on appeal was whether there was substantial
similarity to permit an inference of actual use of the Benays’ Screenplay
by Warner Brothers. 153 The Ninth Circuit found that when a completed
creative work is submitted under an implied-in-fact contract, the
elements covered by the contract are not limited to those elements that
Thus, the court recognized that
are protected by copyright. 154
unprotectable elements can be used to show substantial similarity in a
California breach of an implied-in-fact contract claim. 155 The rationale is
that although an unprotectable idea could not be adequate consideration
for a promise to pay money, the disclosure of the idea may be of
substantial benefit to the person to whom the idea is disclosed. 156
Therefore, unprotectable ideas may be what the production company is
bargaining for and seeking to actually use in its movie. 157 This principle
was introduced by California Supreme Court Justice Roger J. Traynor in
his dissenting opinion in Stanley v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.:
The policy that precludes protection of an abstract idea by copyright
does not prevent its protection by contract. Even though an idea is not
property subject to exclusive ownership, its disclosure may be of

151

Id. at 625.
Id. at 631.
153
Id. at 630.
154
Id. at 631 (“California case law does not support the proposition that when a complete
script is submitted under an implied-in-fact contract, only those elements of the script that are
protected under federal copyright law are covered by the contract.”).
155
Id.
156
Stanley v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 221 P.2d 73, 85 (Cal. 1950) (Traynor, J.,
dissenting).
157
Id.
152
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substantial benefit to the person to whom it is disclosed. That
disclosure may therefore be consideration for a promise to pay. 158

Unprotectable elements may be of value to a producer since
unprotectable elements “are not freely usable by the entertainment media
until the latter are made aware of them.” 159 For example, in Reginald v.
New Line Cinema Corp., Rex Reginald submitted his idea for a movie
entitled The Party Crasher’s Handbook to New Line Cinema with the
condition of payment if his idea was used. 160 Reginald brought a breach
of implied-in-fact contract claim alleging that he was never paid after his
idea was used for New Line Cinema’s motion picture film entitled The
Wedding Crashers, which, like The Party Crasher’s Handbook, was
about two bachelors who crashed parties. 161 The California Court of
Appeal, Second Appellate District, noted that there is no requirement that
the substantial similarity be between protectable elements in a California
breach of implied-in-fact contact. 162 The rule is justified by the theory
that the bargain is not for an idea itself, but for the services of conveying
the idea. 163
For example, imagine that New Line Cinema obligated itself to pay
for the disclosure of unprotectable scènes-à-faire involving beautiful
women, gourmet food, and artfully blended drinks. Although such ideas
are unprotectable elements that naturally flow from a premise about two
bachelors who crash parties, New Line Cinema might not have included
such elements in its movie if it were not for the disclosure of the ideas.
Hypothetically, New Line Cinema therefore entered into the bargain
specifically to use these unprotectable ideas in its movie. Thus, unlike a
federal copyright infringement claim, in which a showing of substantial
similarity is limited to a comparison of protectable elements, actual use
in a California breach of an implied-in-fact contract claim can be shown
by substantial similarity between unprotectable elements. 164 Such a
standard, however, is problematic.

158

Id.
Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 265 (Cal. 1956).
160
Reginald v. New Line Cinema Corp., No. B190025, 2008 WL 588932, *1-3 (Cal. Ct. App.
Mar. 5, 2008).
161
Id. at *4.
162
Id. (citing Weitzenkorn v. Lesser, 256 P.2d 947, 956 (Cal. 1953)).
163
Chandler v. Roach, 319 P.2d 776, 781 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (“There is nothing
unreasonable in the assumption that a producer would obligate himself to pay for the disclosure of an
idea which he would otherwise be legally free to use, but which in fact, he would be unable to use
but for the disclosure.”).
164
Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 632 (9th Cir. 2010).
159
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C.

THE NEED FOR A NEW STANDARD FOR DETERMINING ACTUAL USE

1.

The Standard Used in Benay Does Not Adequately Reflect Actual
Use of Plaintiff’s Idea by Defendant

Under the standard used in Benay, a producer who accepts the
submission of a screenwriter’s work but does not pay for it could be
found liable for breach of an implied-in-fact contract, regardless of the
fact that the producer did not actually use the screenwriter’s work to
produce its film. 165 For example, in Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures
Corp., Art Buchwald alleged that he was contractually owed money for
the use of his screenplay King for a Day in the Paramount Pictures film
Coming to America, both of which were premised on an African
aristocrat who travels to America. 166 Since Paramount Pictures created a
work with similar unprotectable elements that naturally arose from the
two works’ shared premise, the court ruled in favor of Buchwald, finding
that King for a Day and Coming to America were substantially similar
for purposes of actual use. 167 Furthermore, Paramount Pictures was
found liable even though it contended that the film was developed
independently from Buchwald’s work. 168
As Buchwald illustrates, by refusing to compensate the screenwriter
after producing a work with similar unprotectable elements, the producer
could be held liable to the screenwriter for breach of an implied-in-fact
contract, whether or not the producer actually used the screenwriter’s
work. 169 It is entirely possible for two works created by two different
parties to have similar unprotectable elements even though one party
neither used nor copied the other party’s work when creating its own
production. 170 However, in such a situation, the producer, who is sued
for breach of implied-in-fact contract for refusing to compensate the
screenwriter, could be found liable simply because the work is based on
165

Peter Swarth, The Law of Ideas: New York and California Are More Than 3,000 Miles
Apart, 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 115, 130 (1990).
166
Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. C 706083, 1990 WL 357611, at *15 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Jan. 8, 1990).
167
Id.
168
Id. at *6 (noting that Paramount Pictures reportedly began developing the shooting script
for Coming to America based upon a story by Eddie Murphy).
169
Peter Swarth, The Law of Ideas: New York and California Are More Than 3,000 Miles
Apart, 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 115, 130 (1990).
170
See, e.g., Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 625 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting
that the Film and the Screenplay shared similarities between unprotectable elements even though the
Film was allegedly developed independently from the Screenplay).
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a similar idea that naturally flows from the screenwriter and producer’s
shared type of genre. 171 Thus, the standard used in Benay reflects not
that the producer actually used the screenwriter’s work but that the
producer merely created a work involving similar unprotectable elements
that inevitably arise from their shared genre. 172
2.

The Standard Used in Benay Impedes Copyright Law’s Attempt to
Promote the Free Flow of Ideas

While federal copyright law attempts to “promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts,” 173 the state contract law standard applied in
Benay dissuades producers from accepting screenplays for fear of
breaching an implied-in-fact contract. 174 For instance, when a creative
work is submitted to a producer, or any prospective purchaser for that
matter, the screenwriter’s work may contain a vast amount of
unprotectable ideas, all of which may be staples of literature and art. To
avoid liability under an implied-in-fact contract, a producer who accepts
the screenwriter’s work must not only avoid using the screenplay but
also avoid producing any work involving similar unprotectable
elements. 175 Holding a producer liable for failing to compensate the
screenwriter after merely creating a work involving similar unprotectable
elements will cause producers to be hesitant to accept screenplays for
fear of breaching implied-in-fact contracts. 176 Screenwriters will in turn
be discouraged from expressing ideas and writing screenplays when they
find it difficult to sell their works to producers. 177
For example, in Minniear v. Tors, Harold Minniear alleged that he
entered into a contract with Ziv Television Program in which Minniear
would be reasonably compensated if his idea for a television series
entitled The Underwater Legion was used. 178 After Ziv Television
Program released the television series entitled Sea Hunt, which, like
Minniear’s The Underwater Legion, was premised on an underwater
171

See, e.g., Buchwald, 1990 WL 357611, at *15.
Peter Swarth, The Law of Ideas: New York and California Are More Than 3,000 Miles
Apart, 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 115, 130 (1990).
173
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
174
Kelly Rem, Note, Idea Protection in California: Are Writers Too Readily Compensated for
Their Screenplays?, 28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 333, 350 (2006).
175
Peter Swarth, The Law of Ideas: New York and California Are More Than 3,000 Miles
Apart, 13 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 115, 129 (1990).
176
Kelly Rem, Note, Idea Protection in California: Are Writers Too Readily Compensated for
Their Screenplays?, 28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 333, 350 (2006).
177
Id. at 350-51.
178
Minniear v. Tors, 72 Cal. Rptr. 287, 291 (Ct. App. 1968).
172
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adventure, Minniear brought a breach of implied-in-fact contract claim
alleging that he was never compensated after his idea was used. 179 The
California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, held that there
were enough similarities in the basic plot ideas between The Underwater
Legion and Sea Hunt to infer that Ziv Television Program actually used
Minniear’s idea. 180 The money and resources absorbed by such litigation
would discourage the producer from accepting further works submitted
by other screenwriters. 181 As a result, screenwriters will be disinclined
to spend time and effort on writing screenplays when producers
repeatedly decline to consider their ideas. 182 Thus, the standard used in
Benay discourages the free flow of ideas by imposing liability simply
because the producer created a product involving unprotectable elements
similar to those in the screenwriter’s work. 183 Fortunately, there is a
solution to this problem.
IV. PROPOSED STANDARD FOR DETERMINING ACTUAL USE
A.

PROPOSED STANDARD DEFINED

In a California claim for breach of an implied-in-fact contract over
the use of an idea, a court may appropriately infer actual use through a
showing of the defendant’s access to the plaintiff’s work and substantial
similarity between the two works at issue. 184 However, since the
substantial-similarity standard used in Benay inadequately reflects actual
use and discourages the free flow of ideas, courts should model the
substantial-similarity standard in California breach of implied-in-fact
contract claims after the federal copyright infringement standard found
under the extrinsic test. Specifically, a court should examine the
individual elements of both works and separate the protectable elements
from the unprotectable elements. The court should then inquire into
whether the protectable elements, and not the unprotectable elements, are
substantially similar. If all the similarities between the works arise from
the use of unprotectable elements, the court should conclude that the
plaintiff failed to demonstrate actual use. In effect, the California
179

Id.
Id. at 294.
181
Kelly Rem, Note, Idea Protection in California: Are Writers Too Readily Compensated for
Their Screenplays?, 28 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 333, 350 (2006).
182
Id. at 350-51.
183
Id. at 350.
184
Mann v. Columbia Pictures, Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 522, 534 (Ct. App. 1982).
180
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standard would match the federal standard such that if the court does not
find substantial similarity under a federal copyright infringement claim,
the court should be precluded from finding substantial similarity under a
California breach of implied-in-fact contract claim. Therefore, to
successfully prove that the defendant has actually used his or her idea,
the plaintiff must show substantial similarity between protectable
elements, not unprotectable elements.
B.

PROPOSED STANDARD JUSTIFIED

1.

The Proposed Standard for Determining Actual Use Better
Indicates Actual Use of Plaintiff’s Idea by Defendant

Substantial similarity between protectable elements, rather than
unprotectable elements, is a better indication that an idea was disclosed
by the plaintiff and used by the defendant. In Green v. Schwarzenegger,
William Green, author of a screenplay entitled The Minotaur, brought an
action alleging copyright infringement by the creators of the movie
Terminator 2: Judgment Day. 185 Although both works contained a
similar message about the future of mankind, the United States District
Court for the Central District of California found no infringement
because a closer examination of the protectable elements in the two
works exposed more dissimilarities than similarities. 186 As Green
demonstrates, even though two works can share the same basic plot
premise, they can have completely different protectable elements. 187
Whereas unprotectable elements naturally arise from the limited amount
of ideas within the public domain, 188 protectable elements do not derive
from basic plot premises. 189 Because of a protectable element’s original
character, it is less likely for two authors to express the same protectable
element in their respective works. Therefore, substantial similarity
between protectable elements, rather than unprotectable elements, better
reflects the possibility that the defendant actually used the plaintiff’s
idea.
185

Green v. Schwarzenegger, No. CV 93-5893-WMB, 1995 WL 874191, at *1 (C.D. Cal.
July 12, 1995).
186
Id. at *18 (“[T]he evil Terminator’s ability to mold its liquid metal body in any shape,
which gives rise to its ability to grow ‘adaptable limbs,’ is very different from the Minotaur’s less
technologically sophisticated shape-changing.”).
187
See generally id. at *18.
188
See Desny v. Wilder, 299 P.2d 257, 271 (Cal. 1956) (“It is manifest that authors must
work with and from ideas or themes which basically are in the public domain.”).
189
See generally Green, 1995 WL 874191, at *18.
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The standard of proof proposed by this Note will create a better
filter to separate those cases dealing with actual instances of
unauthorized copying from those cases dealing with coincidental
similarities. For example, in Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner
Entertainment Co., Gwen O’Donnell and Funky Films, creators of the
screenplay The Funk Parlor, brought a copyright infringement action
against Time Warner Entertainment, producer of the television series Six
Feet Under. 190 Limiting its analysis to similarities between protectable
elements, the Ninth Circuit concluded that The Funk Parlor and Six Feet
Under were not substantially similar, given that the similarities between
the death of a caring father and return of a detached son were
unprotectable scènes-à-faire and “at best, coincidental.” 191 The limited
amount of unprotectable scenes and characters that necessarily flow from
a shared premise leaves ample opportunity for natural and coincidental
similarities. 192 Furthermore, these similarities between unprotectable
elements can exist simply because such elements frequently occur in all
forms of art and science. 193 Protectable elements, however, stem from
more-unique ideas than mere unprotectable scènes-à-faire, and a
protectable element’s uniqueness makes it easier to recognize instances
of coincidental similarities. The more unique and rare an element is in a
creative work, the more likely that any similarity to the element was the
result of the defendant actually using the plaintiff’s idea. Thus, a
standard that permits a showing of substantial similarity between
protectable elements only will provide a better sense of actual use by
giving judges and triers of fact more confidence in determining when the
elements of the works at issue are coincidentally similar.
2.

The Proposed Standard for Determining Actual Use Will Provide
State Contract Law Protection While Preserving the Purposes and
Objectives of Federal Copyright Law

Requiring substantial similarity strictly between protectable
elements will preserve copyright law’s idea-expression dichotomy by
denying protection to unprotectable elements. In Berkic v. Crichton, for
instance, Ted Berkic wrote a screenplay called Reincarnation and
brought an action for copyright infringement against the makers of a
190

Funky Films, Inc. v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 462 F.3d 1072, 1074 (9th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 1081.
192
See generally, Desny, 299 P.2d at 271.
193
See Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1294 (9th Cir. 1985) (“The common use of such
stock . . . merely reminds us that in Hollywood, as in the life of men generally, there is only rarely
anything new under the sun.”).
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movie entitled Coma, which, like Reincarnation, involved young
professionals exposed to a criminal investigation. 194 Limiting its
comparison to strictly protectable elements, the Ninth Circuit found no
substantial similarity between the protectable elements of the works and
noted that similarity between unprotectable elements “merely reminds us
that in Hollywood, as in the life of men generally, there is only rarely
anything new under the sun.” 195 With a requirement that substantial
similarity be shown between protectable elements, screenwriters will not
be given monopolies over customary staples of literature and art. 196 The
public will therefore be encouraged to use the same unprotectable ideas
in creating their own works, while authors will be afforded state contract
law protection over their protectable expressions. 197
Since the standard used in Benay impedes the production of works
of art and science, the state law standard should yield to the federal law
standard as a matter of conflict preemption. 198 In Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., Bonita Boats, a boat manufacturer, sought to
enjoin Thunder Craft Boats from using a direct molding process 199 to
duplicate Bonita Boats’ boat hulls. 200 At the time, a Florida statute made
it unlawful for any person to use the direct molding process to duplicate
products for sale without the written permission of the other party.201
The United States Supreme Court held that since the Florida statute stood
as an obstacle to the federal policy favoring the free competition of
unprotectable ideas, the state law must be invalidated to the extent that it
conflicted with the federal law. 202 Along the same lines, since the
standard used in Benay impedes the promotion of art and science by
offering protection to unprotectable ideas, the state law standard should
match the federal law standard so as to create a national uniform rule that
safeguards only protectable expression, thereby encouraging the free

194

Id. at 1291.
Id. at 1294.
196
Id. at 1293-94.
197
Id. at 1291.
198
Conflict preemption occurs when the federal law controls and the state law is invalidated
because the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the objectives of federal law.
See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 168 (1989).
199
Direct molding process is the process by which one party uses a particular product to
create a mold for mass production and sale of a duplicate product. Id. at 163-64.
200
Id. at 145.
201
Id. at 144-45.
202
Id. at 151 (“[S]tate regulation of intellectual property must yield to the extent that it
clashes with the balance struck by Congress . . . .”).
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flow of ideas. 203 As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor articulated for the
unanimous court:
One of the fundamental purposes behind the Patent and Copyright
Clauses of the Constitution was to promote national uniformity in the
realm of intellectual property. . . . Given the inherently ephemeral
nature of property in ideas, and the great power such property has to
cause harm to the competitive policies which underlay the federal
patent [and copyright] laws, the demarcation of broad zones of public
and private right is “the type of regulation that demands a uniform
national rule.” 204

CONCLUSION
Now picture again the screenwriter who watches a movie and
realizes that it is substantially similar to one of her very own registered
screenplays. If the screenwriter brings a breach of an implied-in-fact
contract claim under California law, without a requirement that the
similarity be between protectable elements, the production company
could be found liable if the film involved the same unprotectable
elements as the screenwriter’s work, regardless of the fact that the
producer did not actually use the screenwriter’s idea. It is not hard to
imagine the flood gates opening, the crowds of screenwriters filing
lawsuits, and the producer’s last few words: lights, camera . . . civil
action. In California breach of implied-in-fact contract claims, courts
should use the standard proposed by this Note, so that, in order to
successfully prove that the defendant has actually used his or her idea,
the plaintiff must show substantial similarity between protectable
elements, not unprotectable elements.
BRIAN CASIDO *
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Id. at 162-63 (quoting Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 179 (1978)).
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